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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE LAND BOARD, 
Plaintiff -Respondent, 
vs. 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF FISH 
AND GAME, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
10154 
This is an appeal to determine whether sand and 
gravel are mineral in character within the reservation of 
Section 65-1-16, U. C. A. 1953, and in the event such sub-
stances are considered to be mineral, then to further de-
termine whether the State Land Board is required to ob-
tain the consent of the State agency using or holding the 
land whereon the sand and gravel are situated, under the 
provisions of Section 65-7-10, U. C. A. 1953. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court held that sand and gravel were min-
eral in character and, therefore, reserved to the State un-
der Section 65-1-16, and further held that the Land Board 
had authority to lease sand and gravel as minerals without 
obtaining the consent of the State agency using and hold-
ing the land. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant on appeal requests the court to classify sand 
and gravel as non-mineral in character, or in the alterna-
tive, to hold that, even if they are mineral in character, 
they may only be leased by the Land Board after it obtains 
the consent of the State agency utilizing the lands where 
the sand and gravel are s~ituated. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The land in question is owned by the Utah State De-
partment of Fish and Game and is all of Section 32, T. 3 
S., R. 25 E., S. L. M. This land was a State school section 
which was sold under contract to a private party, and a 
patent from the State of Utah duly and regularly issued 
to said purchaser under date of March 18, 1946, "reserv-
ing to the State of Utah, all coal and other minerals in the 
above lands and to it, or persons authorized by it, the right 
to prospect for, mine and remove coal and other minerals 
from the same * * *" (Exhibits P-1, P-2). 
The Department of Fish and Game thereafter pur-
chased the land in question from the private party, with 
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the private party reserving minerals in the same language 
that the State had reserved minerals in the patent (T. 2). 
In the late fall of 1963, the Land Board advised the Depart-
ment of Fish and Game that it intended to lease the subject 
land for sand and gravel purposes to a party who had made 
application for such lease, and the Department of Fish and 
Game replied that sand and gravel were not considered to 
be minerals under rulings of the Attorney General's Office, 
and that further, the Land Board was required to obtain 
the consent of the Department of Fish and Game prior to 
leasing any minerals on lands owned and controlled by the 
Department, and that the Department could not give its 
consent to a surface stripping of sand and gravel mater-
ials (T. 3 and 4). Thereafter the Land Board instituted 
the present litigation for a determination that sand and 
gravel were mineral in character within the meaning of 
the statutory reservation, and the Department of Fish and 
Game answered, denying that sand and gravel were miner-
als, and further setting up by way of an affirmative de-
fense the fact that the Land Board must first obtain the 
consent of the Department prior to leasing minerals on 
Department land, and that such consent had reasonably 
been withheld. 
At the hearing in the lower court, it was stipulated 
that there are certain quantities of sand and gravel on the 
land in question and that these substances could be used 
in a commercially feasible manner if located near areas 
where there was a significant demand. Counsel for the 
Land Board asked the court .to take judicial notice of the 
communities in northeastern Utah where there might be 
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a market for sand and gravel substances (T. 4-6). It is 
reasonably clear from the stipulation that the sand and 
gravel in question are common varieties without any pecul-
iar or unique features. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SAND AND GRAVEL ARE NOT MINERALS 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 65-1-
16, U. C. A. 1953. 
The first question for determination is whether sand 
and gravel are to be considered mineral deposits within 
the meaning of Section 65-1-16, U. C. A. 1953, which pro-
vides as follows : 
"All applications to purchase, approved subse-
quent to May 12, 1919, shall be subject to a reser-
vation to the state of all coal and other mineral de-
posits in said lands, with the right to the state or 
persons authorized by it to prospect for, mine and 
remove the same as provided by law, and all certifi-
cates of sale and all patents issued therefor shall 
contain such reservation." 
It is clear that all minerals included within the above 
language were reserved by the State of Utah when it issued 
its patent under date of March 18, 1946, and the State still 
holds and controls minerals so reserved in the section of 
land in question. When the Department of Fish and Game 
purchased the land, it acquired everything that the private 
seller had obtained from the State of Utah, but, of course, 
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did not acquire any greater rights than the State had re .. 
linquished to the private purchaser. 
The State of Utah has never considered sand and 
gravel to be minerals within the statutory language quoted 
above. The specific question was raised, however, in 1955 
when the State Land Board inquired as to whether these 
substances could be considered minerals, and the Attorney 
General ruled that they were not. See Opinion 55-088 is-
sued under date of August 16, 1955 and appearing in Bi-
ennial Report of Attorney General, June 30, 1956, at page 
166. After reviewing a number of cases, Attorney General 
E. R. Callister observed : 
"In view of the foregoing authorities, it is the 
opinion of this office that gravel is not within the 
meaning of our statute subject to reservation by the 
State of Utah in the absence of express language in 
the conveyance to that effect." 
Then, under date of July 9, 1956, Attorney General 
E. R. Callister answered a further question posed by the 
State Land Board, i.e., whether clay could be considered a 
mineral within the mineral reservation clause. See Opin-
ion 56-075, dated July 9, 1956, Biennial Report of Attorney 
General, June 30, 1958, at page 189. The Attorney Gen-
eral in that opinion reviewed a considerable number of 
cases from Utah and other jurisdictions and concluded that 
clay had a special intrinsic quality which justified its treat-
ment as a mineral. But, the Attorney General was careful 
to distinguish clay from sand and gravel : 
"There are cases on both sides of this question 
and an attempt has been made to reach a rational 
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conclusion based upon the intention of the Legisla-
ture, and on a careful consideration of the intrinsic 
qualities of clay itself as compared with ordinary 
soil deposits or sand and gravel. 
"* * ::!: 
"Clay is to be distinguished from such other 
components of the earth's under surface as sand 
and gravel by its distinct mineral composition, 
whereas sand and gravel for general commercial 
use are merely aggregations of rocks or conglomera-
tions of mineral fragments. 
"* * * 
"The value of sand and gravel as distinguished 
from clay, usually is entirely dependent on location 
and aocessibility, and they are not of distinct or un-
usual worth in and of themselves since substitutions 
of other materials can be made in such filling, grad-
ing and cement making operations." 
The following year the Attorney General was further 
asked by the State Land Board whether volcanic cinders 
could be considered mineral in character within the mean-
ing of the mineral reserve clause. Attorney General E. R. 
Callister concluded that volcanic cinders properly were 
mineral in nature. See Opinion 57-031, issue4 under date 
of April 11, 1957, appearing in Biennial Report of the 
Attorney General, June 30, 1958, at page 195. Again the 
Attorney General was careful to explain that sand and 
gravel clearly were not mineral in character, even though 
it might appear that they were similar in some respects to 
volcanic cinders : 
"The two types of substances which are the 
common exceptions from the definition as minerals 
when found under this state's surface are gravel 
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and ordinary sand. They are valuable only in re-
spect to their use as fill and in respect to their lo-
cation. They are not generally considered to be in-
trinsically valuable in and of themselves. 
"As to volcanic cinders, they might or might 
not have intrinsic value, depending on the use to 
which they are put. Certainly, they could be used 
as sand and gravel are used. 
"However, the usual use made of such cinders 
is in the making of building blocks. Their unique 
value in such process is their extremely light weight 
combined with strength. Because of this they are 
of more use than other substances in such construc-
tion." 
It is submitted that the foregoing opinions of the At-
torney General are correct, although it must be recognized 
that there is a difference of judicial opinion as to whether 
sand and gravel should be considered to be mineral in char-
aeter. The pattern of decisions relating to whether sand 
and gravel could be minerals for the purpose of making 
valid locations under the Federal mining laws is interest-
ing. The Supreme Court of Oregon in Loney v. Scott, 57 
Ore. 378, 112 Pac. 172, held that sand and gravel could be 
considered mineral under the mining laws, and pointed out 
the economic uses to which sand and gravel were then be-
ing employed. The Federal Land Department apparently 
disagreed with the Loney conclusion. (See Zimmerman v. 
Bennson, 39 L. D. 310; Lindley on Mines, Vol. 1, 3rd Ed., 
Sec. 93.) Thereafter, the Secretary of the Interior de-
termined that sand and gravel could be considered mineral 
in character. (See Layman v. Ellis, 52 L. D. 714 (1929) 
and United States v. Barngrover, 57 I. D. 533 (1942) .) 
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The most significant factor in the Federal pattern, 
however, is that Congress did not agree with the geologi-
cal niceties perceived by the Secretary of the Interior, and 
in the Act of July 23, 1955, 69 Stat. 368, 30 U. S. C. A., 
Sec. 611, Congress specifically provided: 
"No deposit of common varieties of sand, stone, 
gravel, pumice, pumicite, or cinders and no deposit 
of petrified wood shall be deemed a valuable min-
eral deposit within the meaning of the mining laws 
of the United States so as to give effective validity 
to any mining claim hereafter located under such 
mining laws." 
It is obvious that Congress either never had intended 
that sand and gravel should be considered to be minerals 
locatable under the Federal mining laws, or that, if such 
a treatment had been justified under earlier statutes, Con-
gress felt that there was no longer any justification for 
treating common varieties of such substances as mineral. 
It is believed that the Utah Legislature would take the 
same view if this court were to declare sand and gravel to 
be mineral in their common varieties. 
Utah case law on the question under discussion is not 
very helpful. It is true that this court has ruled that min-
erals can include substances removed from the earth by 
processes other than subterranean excavations. (See Nephi 
Plaster and Manufacturing Co. v. Juab County, 33 Utah 
114, 93 Pac. 53 (1907), wherein it was held that gypsum 
was a mineral.) The Utah court has also ruled that salt 
in solution in the Great Salt Lake was mineral in character 
because of the great quantity contained in the waters of 
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tho lake. (See Deserct Livestock v. State, 110 Utah 239, 
171 P. 2d 401 (1946)). However, there is no language in 
the Utah cases suggesting that sand and gravel of common 
varieties would be mineral. In fact, there is some rational 
basis for believing that the general legislative intent was to 
exclude common varieties of sand and gravel from the min-
eral reserve clause. These substances are commonly found 
at or near the surface of the earth in a variety of mixtures 
and qualities and are, in fact, part of the earth itself, and 
in many cases part of the surface of the earth. Section 
65-1-17, U. C. A. 1953, suggests that minerals are under-
ground deposits as distinguished from surface substances : 
"Lands in which minerals are reserved, the 
surface of which has a value for other purposes, 
may be sold under the provisions of law relating 
to the sale of state lands, subject to such reserva-
tion." 
Section 65-1-20, U. C. A. 1953, similarly distinguishes be-
tween surface uses by surface owners and mineral develop-
ment and extraction by those having .mineral interests. 
There simply is nothing in Utah legislation suggesting that 
common varieties of sand and gravel were contemplated 
by the Legislature in the mineral reserve clause. 
Turning now to a consideration of general case law in 
other jurisdictions, it must be admitted that there is a split 
of judicial authority. All cases agree that common varie-
ties of sand and gravel in marginal quantities, not com-
mercially valuable, are not minerals within the meaning 
of either a statutory reservation or a private reservation 
or grant. The split in authority appears when usually val-
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uable deposits of sand and gravel of high quality or unique 
characteristics are discovered. In such situations some 
courts have held that those substances should be treated 
as mineral and some courts have held that they should not. 
It cannot be denied that sand and gravel are mineral in 
nature within a very broad classification, because many 
substances not considered to be mineral within the mean-
ing of mineral grants and reservations must be classified 
as mineral within such broad geological classifications. 
This is illustrated by the following summary: 
"While the word 'minerals' includes, in a tech-
nical sense, all natural inorganic substances form-
ing a part of the soil, the term is used in so many 
senses, dependent upon the context, that such a 
definition is obviously too broad, for it would throw 
little, if any, light upon what was meant in a par-
ticular case. So, to apply the word in the significa-
tion in which it is employed in the scientific division 
of all matter into the traditional three kingdoms, to 
a grant of land containing an exception of the min-
erals, would be absurd, since all land belongs to the 
mineral kingdom, and the exception could not be 
given effect without destroying the grant. * * *" 
(Am. Jur., Vol. 36, page 283.) 
But one should not be misled into thinking that such 
a broad classification of the term "mineral" can have any 
realistic probative value in ascertaining the legislative in-
tent in the mineral reserve clause. While various substances 
have been considered to be mineral in nature, the general 
judicial rule is that sand and gravel are not: 
"In application of the foregoing principles of 
construction, an unqualified grant or reservation 
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of minerals has been held to include not only the 
coal, iron, etc., but also such substances as oil and 
gas, diamonds, fluor spar, gypsum, granite, shale, 
paint stone, pulpstone, freestone, and other sub-
stances. Limestone is not included in a grant or 
reservation of minerals and neither is sand, gravel 
or clay. * * * (Am. Jur., Vol. 36, Sec. 35, pp. 
306-07.) 
The foregoing general rule as stated by American J ur-
isprudence is confirmed by Corpus Juris Secundum: 
"In a broad, general sense, as belonging to one 
of the three great divisions of matter, animal, veg-
etable, and mineral, gravel and sand may be con-
sidered as minerals, but in a commercial sense, they 
have been held, according to the circumstances of 
the particular case, to be minerals and also not to 
be minerals." (C. J. S., Vol. 58, Sec. 2 (3), page 
21.) 
Speaking more specifically with regard to statutory 
and deed language either granting or reserving minerals, 
the following general rule is announced : 
"Sand and gravel ordinarily are not included 
within a grant or reservation of minerals or of min-
eral royalty, although there is on the land involved 
sand or gravel susceptible of commercial production 
and use. * * *" (C. J. S., Vol. 58, Sec. 155, 
pp. 324-25.) 
There are a great number of cases which could be 
quoted and argued at length for both the pro and con po-
sition as to whether common varieties of sand and gravel 
should be minerals. Generally, those cases holding sand 
and gravel in commercially valuable deposits to be mineral, 
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do so on the theory that such substances can be classified 
as mineral within broad geological definitions, and further, 
upon the ground that the legislative or grantor reservation 
was to reserve anything of broad mineral character which 
was commercially valuable beyond the specific purpose for 
whi·ch the land was sold. Those cases holding common 
varieties of sand and gravel not to be mineral in nature, 
without regard to whether they appear in commercially 
valuable deposits, have done so largely on the theory that 
sand and gravel are so common and compose such a sub-
stantial part of the surface, and under surface, of the land 
as to be beyond the statutory or grantor intent in the res-
ervation of minerals; and further, that sand and gravel are 
not any particular mineral, but simply fragments of a 
great many different minerals (rocks) which have no 
value as to the particular minerals, but only as to the frag-
mentary aggregate. The general feeling seems to be that 
the Legislature, or the grantor, should specifically identify 
and reserve such common substances as sand and gravel 
if the intent is to reserve them, because otherwise they 
would not ordinarily be considered within a mineral re-
serve clause and should, therefore, pass to the grantee. 
It is submitted that the past rulings of the Utah At-
torney General are correct; that the history and pattern of 
mining locations under Federal statutes have shown that 
sand and gravel in common varieties should not be consid-
.ered to be mineral; and that the statements quoted above 
from American Jurisprudence and Corpus Juris Secundum 
accurately state the general rules of judicial construction 
of mineral reserve clauses. 
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Without detailing the .facts and rationale of each case, 
the following list of authorities is suggested as fully sup-
porting the above quoted general rule that sand and gravel 
are not minerals : 
Authorities 
Cases: 
Barker v. Mintz, 215 Pac. 534 (Colo., 1923) 
Beck v. Harvey, 164 P. 2d 399 (Okla., 1944) 
Farrel v. Sayre, 270 P. 2d 190 (Colo., 1954) 
Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 58 A. 486 (Pa., 1904) 
Holloway Gravel Co. v. McKowen, 9 So. 2d 228 (La., 1942) 
Irion v. Lyons, 113 So. 857 (La.) 
Kinder v. LaSalle County Carbon Coal Co., 141 N. E. 537 
(Ill., 1923) 
Lillington Stone Co. v. Maxwell, 166 S. E. 351 (North Caro-
lina, 1932) 
Lord Provost of Glasgow v. Farie, L. R., 13 App. Cas. 657 
Psencik v. Wessells, 205 S. W. 2d 658 (Tex. 1947) 
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Liberty Gravel & Sand Co., 128 
S. W. 2d 471 (Tex. Civ. App.) 
Staples v. Young, 1 Ir. Rep. 135 (1908) 
State v. Hendrix, 167 P. 2d 43 (Okla., 1946) 
Steinman Development Co. v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co., 
290 Fed. 832 (D. C., 1922) 
U. S. v. Aitken, 25 Philippine 7, 14 
Waring v. Foden, 1 Ch. 276 (Eng., 1936) 
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Watkins v. Certain-Teed Products Corp., 231 S. W. 2d 981 
(Tex. Civ. App.) 
Winsett v. Watson, 206 S. W. 2d 656 (Tex., 1947) 
Witherspoon v. Campbell, 69 So. 2d 384 (Miss.) 
Treatises: 
17 A. L. R. 166 
86 A. L. R. 969, 989 
1 A. L. R. 2d 790 
It is believed that the court's attention should be called 
to a matter of practical consequence. The issue on appeal 
will have a stare decisis result which will affect every per-
son who has purchased lands from the State of Utah. Up 
to this point, the Land Board, as well as the purchasers, 
has believed that sand and gravel were not minerals and, 
therefore, that these sustances passed with the land to the 
purchaser. This is obvious from the fact that the Land 
'Board has accepted and relied upon the opinions from the 
Attorney General's office for the last nine years without 
questioning them in any legal proceeding until the present 
one. No private owners of land purchased from the State 
are parties to this proceeding. But, if this court determines 
that common varieties of sand and gravel are mineral 
within the meaning of the reserve clause, these private 
parties will automatically be divested of a valuable aspect 
of ownership which both they and the Land Board previ-
ously thought had passed to private ownership. 
Another practical problem is that the Land Board 
presently is leasing as sand and gravel simple fill dirt 
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which is utilized by the Department of Highways in the 
construction of the freeway program and other road pro-
jects. Perhaps no particular problem is involved when a 
lease of that nature is executed between two State agen-
cies of that type. But a problem has arisen in the instant 
case in that deposits of sand and gravel could be sold by 
the lessee for fill dirt purposes. It might be argued that 
the sand and gravel could not be extracted from the earth 
unless it was being used for specific commercial sand and 
gravel purposes and not as fill dirt, but the practical fact 
is if the lessee removes the substances containing some 
common varieties of sand and gravel, he is doing so be-
cause it is commercially practicable for him to do so. It 
would thus be difficult to judicially regulate the removal 
of the surface of the earth which had some deposits of sand 
and gravel in order to determine wh~ther these substances, 
after their removal, were being utilized for a legitimate 
purpose. 
In various parts of the State of Utah, the Department 
of Fish and Game has re-seeded many bench lands to 
greatly improve their value for wildlife grazing. A type of 
gravel appears in all of these lands, and if the Land Board 
can lease these gravel deposits to the Department of High-
ways or to private road contractors, the entire surface of 
these areas can be stripped and used as fill dirt. It is 
doubtful whether the Department of Fish and Game could 
be protected under any bond or other arrangement required 
for the protection of surface owners. (See Section 65-1-20, 
U. C. A. 1953.) The discussion immediately above simply 
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illustrates that private landowners who have purchased 
land from the State would be in a similar position if the 
Land Board could likewise lease their lands for a variety 
of purposes which would serve to excuse extensive surface 
stripping to remove sand and gravel substances. 
It is, therefore, believed that the Legislature did not 
intend common varieties of sand and gravel to be reserved 
to the State under the mineral reserve clause, and that this 
court should declare such substances to be non~mineral in 
nature, at least so far as the mineral reserve clause is con-
cerned. 
POINT II. 
THE LAND BOARD CANNOT LEASE ANY 
MINERALS ON LAND HELD OR USED BY 
OTHER STATE AGENCIES WITHOUT FIRST 
OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF THE AGEN-
CY SO CONCERNED. 
If the court concludes that the common varieties of 
sand and gravel are not included within the mineral re-
serve clause, then it is unnecessary to consider this point. 
But, if the court holds that sand and gravel are mineral in 
character so as to be included within the reservation, then 
appellant contends that the Land Board must still obtain 
the consent of the Department of Fish and Game, because 
that Department owns, controls, and beneficially utilizes 
the land in question for wildlife purposes. 
Section 65-7-10, U. C. A. 1953, provides as follows: 
"Mineral leases of all state lands, shall be made 
exclusively by the land board with the consent of 
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the state agency using or holding such land. The 
proceeds from mineral leases in all state lands with 
the exception of trust lands administered by the 
land board, shall be deposited in the general fund." 
It is difficult to see how the above language is sus-
ceptible of any other interpretation. The statute includes 
all mineral leases of all State lands, and says that such 
leases shall be made exclusively by the Land Board with 
the consent of the State agency using or holding such land. 
The statute does not say that mineral leases may be made 
by the Land Board without the consent of the State agency. 
The position of the Land Board in this case and the holding 
of the lower court was exactly to that effect. How it can 
be eontended or how it can be held that a statute requiring 
the consent of the State agency can mean that the consent 
of the State agency is not required is beyond the imagina-
tion of the appellant. 
It is submitted that the State agency using or holding 
the land cannot arbitrarily or unreasonably refuse to give 
its consent. Certainly the legitimate interests of the agency 
using or holding the land must be balanced with the eco-
nomic benefits to be derived by the State in the mineral 
lease proposed by the Land Board. If the Land Board felt 
in a particular instance that the State agency was being 
unreasonable and that the interests which the agency de-
sired to protect were of less significance than the benefits 
to be derived from a mineral lease, it is clear that the Land 
Board could bring an appropriate action to show that con-
sent was unreasonably being withheld by the agency, and 
the court could judicially declare that the consent must be 
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given in view of the respective interests of the State of 
Utah. 
But that issue is not involved here. There is no allega-
tion or claim that the Department of Fish and Game in any 
respect had been unreasonable in withholding its consent. 
In fact, counsel for the Land Board stated in open court 
that: 
al will stipulate there are valid reasons that 
the State Department of Fish and Game would 
have, based upon their functions in game manage-
ment, wild life management, which would reason-
ably allow them, in good faith, to refuse to lease the 
sand and gravel on the subject lands for exploita-
tion." (T. 4.) 
The obvious intent of the , Legislature was that the 
Land Board not be allowed to issue mineral leases on lands 
being actively and beneficially used by other agencies with-
out coordinating with such agencies, informing them of 
the nature and scope of the proposed mineral lease and ob-
taining the consent of the agency concerned. 
A practice not directly material in this case but which 
justifies brief mention to illustrate a related problem is the 
following: The Department of Fish and Game purchases 
with its own funds (derived from the sale of hunting and 
fishing licenses and not from tax monies) large tracts of 
land from private owners who own mineral rights. 
The Department does not buy mineral rights but it 
always insists upon language in the conveyance declaring 
that sand and gravel are not minerals and that they, there-
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fore, pass as part of the surface ownership to the Depart-
ment. This is so because the lands thus purchased would 
be greatly damaged if sand and gravel could be removed 
by the grantor who reserved mineral rights. But after the 
lands are thus purchased by the Department, they become 
State land, even though the Department by statute is au-
thorized to hold title in its own name. (Section 23-2-20, 
U. C. A. 1953.) Does this mean that the State Land Board 
can issue mineral leases on common varieties of sand and 
gravel obtained by the Department through the purchases 
discussed above? If so, the concern of the Department in 
excluding sand and gravel from the grantor's mineral res-
ervation would be a hollow protection, because the Land 
Board could immediately .lease the sand and gravel to the 
same grantor and he then could do the very thing which 
the Department did not want him to do. The Department 
would not have purchased the land if the grantor had not 
agreed to convey sand and gravel. What a strange sequence 
of events there would be if the same grantor could thus 
obtain the same sand and gravel which he conveyed to the 
Department by leasing the same from the State Land 
Board. No objection would be made if such a mineral 
lease of sand and gravel were to be issued only after the 
consent of the Department had been given, but to permit 
the Land Board to issue such leases without obtaining such 
consent is not only impractical and unreasonable - it is 
directly contrary to the very clear requirement of Section 
65-7-10, U. C. A. 1953. 
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CONCLUSION 
Common varieties of sand and gravel, even though 
available in quantities which would justify a commercial 
use, should not be considered to be minerals within the 
meaning of the mineral reserve clause of Section 65-1-16, 
U. C. A. 1953. 
Even if this court should hold that sand and gravel are 
minerals within the mineral reserve clause, it is clear that 
when these minerals appear on lands owned or used by 
other State agencies, the Land Board must obtain the con-
sent of the agency involved and cannot arbitrarily issue 
such leases without obtaining such consent. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER, 
Attorney General, 
RICHARD L. DEWSNUP, 
Assistant Attorney General, 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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